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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
1

·k·\·1

CORPORATION,
Ynrk Corporation,
Plaintiff,

-vs-

SALT LAKE COUNTY, et al. ,
Defendants.

Case No. 18972

SALT LAKE COUNTY, et al.,
Cross-claimants,
-vs-

THE STATE TAX COMMISSION
OF UTAF, et al. ,
Cross-defendants.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/CROSS-APPELLANTS
SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff, Kennecott Copper Corporation sued Defendant
Salt Lake County, the Utah State Tax Commission and others for
partial refund of Plaintiff's 1981 property taxes previously
paid under protest.

Plaintiff's theory of recovery was that a

recently enacted State Statute requiring County valuation to
include recognition of certain expenses resulted in property
1·aluPd by the County bPing assessed a proportionately lower tax
than

State

valued

properties.

Plaintiff,

believing

such

differences in valuation to be ur.constitutinnal, prnyPc1 that
court proportionately reduce Plaintiff's prnpertj' ass0ssm0nt
refund the difference.
Defendant,
and

filed

a

Salt

counterclaim

Lake County d0n1ed
assPrtinq

valuation techniques do not

fulfill

that

sud1

the

allP<Jatiur

current

State

the constitutional mandat'

found at Article XIII, Section 3, which requires all property
be valued

at

Defendant

alleged

Commission

an

a.mount
the

resulted

equal

to

valuation

in

much

its

value

techniques

nf

in money.
used

Plaintiff's

by

This

thP

property

Ti'!x

being

underassessed and allowed significant property of Plaintiff
escape valuation all together.
Defendant,

Salt

Lake

County

filed

a

cross-claim

against the Utah State Tax Commission asserting similar allegations as those

stated above as well as demanding

review of

certain assessment records of the Tax Commission.

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT
The Tax Division of the Third Judicial District Court
the Honorable Judge

Philip A.

Fishler,

presiding,

memorandum decision after hearing cross motions
Judgment and Motion to Dismiss.

Judge Fishler

entered a

for a
ruled

Summar'.·
against

Plaintiff's claim that the State valued properties were unconstitutionally over-assessed.

The Court granted the motions o'

both the Plaintiff and Defendant,

-2-

Utah State Tax Cnm.rrissicn ,.

dismiss

the respective counterclaim and cross-claim filed by

oPfendant, Salt Lake County.

The Court held the Defendant, Salt

County did not have the requisite standing to maintain the
la1ms 8gainst the individual parties.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant Salt Lake County seeks reversal of the Trial
Court's finding that the County was without standing to maintain
its claims against the above mentioned parties.

That the County

be given the opporrunity to prove by way of its counterclaim
that

plaintiff's property is underassessed and has

assessment.

escaped

The appellant further prays that the Court find

those valuation techniques used by the State Tax Commission to
assess plaintiff's property be found not to fully measure the
cash value of such property and that other methods be used to
re-assess plaintiff's property for all years which Utah law
allows such re-assessments to occur.

And finally,

appellant

asks this honorable Court to find that the mining assessment
book the defendant State Tax Commission is by law required to
maintain be provided the appellant for its review.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1981 the Utah State Legislature enacted a law which
placed a percentage reduction on properties valued by county
0ssessors.

This law, Section 59-5-4.5, U.C.A. as amended 1953,

-3-

requires the local assessor to use 80 pPr c,cnt ,,f theo rr,•r,,,
cash value as its assessable cash value.

The purposP of 11 1 ,

and

bv

the

ass<"ssed

reduction
properties

is

to

achieve

towards

an

equity

l ocu 1

reducing

assessment

level

+,

that

was

previously being enjoyed only by State Assessed properties.
Plaintiff, Kennecott Corporation,

is the owner of a

vast mining operation situated within Salt Lake County (T.R. p4)
The nature of plaintiff's business requires a majority of its
property to be valued by the Utah State Tax Commission instead
of the County Assessor, thereby exempting plaintiff's properties
from the

80

per cent

valuation

Article XIII, Section 11.

ceiling.

Utah Constitution

(T.R. p4).

Plaintiff Kennecott Corporation paid part of its 1981
property
59-11-11,

tax

assessment

U.C.A.

as

under

amended

protest

1953

pursuant

(T.R.

p5).

to

Section

Plaintiff then

filed the action in the lower Court asking for a refund of the
amount paid under protest

(T.R.

p7).

In its complaint, plain-

tiff alleges that the newly enacted valuation
unconstitutional

(T.R.

p6).

Plaintiff thereby claims that its

valuation must be proportionately reduced.
The

limitation is

defendant-appellant

Salt

(T.R. p7).

Lake

County

filed

an

answer to plaintiff's complaint specifically denying plaintiff's
allegations

(T.R.

p44-51).

The

appellant

asserted

a

counterclaim in its answer wherein it alleged that as a result
of

certain

underassessments

made

-4-

by

the

Utah

State

Tax

plaintiff

had

not

'f'>'rty taxes. (T.R. p54-5G)

paid

its

required

share

of

The appellant additionally alleged

1hat rertain properties of plaintiff's had escaped assessment
entirely.
equal

Again resulting in plaintiff not paying its fair and

share

of taxes.

(T.R.

p54-56)

The

appellant

stated

further that Utah law provides that upon discovery of escaped
properties,
prior.

the same may be assessed as far back as five years

(T.R. p56)
The appellant also filed a crossclaim naming the Utah

State Tax Commission as cross defendant. (T.R.

p57-64)

In said

crossclaim, the appellant alleges the State Tax Commission to be
responsible

for

the

properties.

(T.R.

valuation

p58)

Tax Commission has

amended

properties
methodology

It further alleges that the Utah State

(T.R. p58-59)

the provisions

1953,

do

not

equivalent
is

assessment of plaintiff's

failed to value plaintiff's properties at

their full cash value.
"tates that

and

found

in Section 59-5-57,

establish
to

full

therefore

The appellant additionally

a

UCA as

value

for

plaintiff's

cash value

and

the

unconstitutional.

(T.R.

statutory
p59)

The

appellant thereby asks the lower Court to require the Utah State
Tax Commission to

rectify

the

inequities

found

in the past

taxation of plaintiff's properties and to order the State Tax
Commission

to

disregard

Section

59-5-57,

as

the

prescribed

method for valuing plaintiff's properties in the future,

-5-

insofar

as that method of valuation nesults in the unrl•

0

rassc·c-srw 111

escape of plaintiff's property for purpnsPs of taxat101L
In a Second cause of action against the Utah Stdt 0 ,
Commission,
refused

the

appellant

appellant

information

of

the

mines

said

opportunity
and

including plaintiff's.

alleges

other

(T.R.

to

state

p61-62)

Tax

Commission

review
assessed

has

assessment
properties

Appellant believes that

such information is required to be maintained by the Utah State
Tax Commission under Section 59-5-56,

U.C.A.

as amPnded 1953.

The appellant then asked the lower Court to require the State
Tax Commission to maintain such

information and to

require the cross-defendant to allow review of such information
by the appellant.

(T.R. p64)

Appellant further contends that it

needs to know the basis of plaintiff's assessment in order to
properly defend against plaintiff's claims.
The plaintiff taxpayer filed a Motion for Judgment on
the pleadings together with a

supporting memoranda asking the

Court to hold consistently with its allegations.
plll-121)
Motion

(T. R. p9 5-96,

The defendant Ut2h State Tax Commission later filed?

for

Summary

Judgment

as

to

plaintiff's

complaint

supported by a memorandum of points and authorities requestino
the Court

find

the

subject valuation ceiling constitutional

(T.R. pl28-129, pl30-208)
Concurrently

with

plaintiff's

Motion

for

Judgment

consistent with its complaint, it filed a Motion tn dismiss the

-6-

s counterclaim.

'I

(IJ)

CJf

supµorted

The Motion being filed under Rule

the Utah RulPs of Civil Procedure and was again
by

a

memorandum.

(T.R.

p98-99,

plOl-110)

The

defendant Utah State Tax Commission filed a similar motion and
memo!:andum concerning appellant's cross-claim.

(T.R.

p70-72,

p73-94)
Plaintiff's supporting memorandum focuses on:
lack of wrongdoing on
assessrnent,

the

(T.R. pl04);

?ppellant

to

properties,

challenge
(T.R.

taxpayer's part for the under-

b)

the lack of standing held by the

past

pl04);

a) the

c)

assessments

of

plaintiff's

the assertion of a statute of

limitations applying expressly to review by the Tax Commission
instead of the Court as occurred here,

(T.R. plOS-106); and,

d)

lack of statutory authority on the part of the lower Court to
hear matters dealing with the value of plaintiff's property.
(T. R. pl06-108)
The memorandum filed by defendant Utah State Tax
Commission in support of its dismissal motion sets forth similar
arguments

as

plaintiff's,

including:

a)

the

posture

of

appellants to the State Tax Commission being equivalent to a
servant-master

relationship

and

authority to maintain the action,

appellants
(T.R.

thereby

p76-81); b)

lack
lack of

necessary standing on the part of the County to maintain the
cross-claim,

(T.R.

p81-90);

and,

-7-

c)

the mining assessment

information sought by the appellants

is somehow cnn f id en ti a I

(T.R. p90-93)
The appellant responded to the above allegations in
opposing memorandum answering both the plaintiff's and defendac
Utah

State Tax Commission

arguments.

(T.R.

p300-318)

The

appellant cites a host of Utah decisions similar in facts to
present

controversy

necessary standing.

which
(T.R.

find

the

p304-310)

County

as

having

the

The appellant identifies

the Utah statutory authority which invests the Utah Tax Court
with

the

needed

authority

to

properly

adjudicate

counterclaims and cross-claims of appellant.

the

The County also

presented legislative and judicial authority which permits the
Court to re-assess invalid valuations as far back as five tax
years.
The appellant presented evidence which was taken
Kennecott's own records and which was not denied or qualified b:
plaintiff, Kennecott, which established that for the year 1981,
Kennecott paid zero

(0)

value of $436,355,560.00.
also paid zero

(0)

mineral production.

dollars on minerals having a minimum
In 1978, 1979 and 1980, Kennecott

dollars in the face of similar substantial
(T.R. p232-286)

The affidavit of Robert Yates,
Salt Lake

County,

which

was

neither

chief appraisPr for

opposed

nor

refuted,

indicated there was no acreage within Salt Lake County valued

-8-

Sl0.00 per acre in 1981.
1478

(T.R. p. 220-222)

In 1980, 1979 and

Kennecott owned 10,271.60 acres in Salt Lake County valued

at $5.00 per acre; and, in 1977, 12,092.60 acres valued at $5.00
per acre.

(T.R. p. 243)
The

plaintiff

filed

a

memorandum replying to

appellant's points and authorities.

(T.R. p320-331)

the

A response

from the defendant Utah State Tax Commission was also filed.
(T.R. p332-341)

The appellant then duly filed a response to the

opposing parties' memoranda.

(T.R. p.650-657)

The Court filed a memorandum decision in this case on
December 9,
59-5-4.5,

1982.
to

be

The Honorable Judge Fishler held Section
constitutionally

plaintiff's refund request.

valid

thereby

denying

The Court additionally found the

appellant to lack necessary standing to raise the earlier filed
counterclaim and crossclaim and therefore dismissed the same.
The County duly filed a Notice of Appeal from that
decision thereby bringing its claims before this Court.

POINT I
PLAINTIFF TAXPAYER HAS PLACED ITS VALUATION IN ISSUE
BY FILING THE PRESENT ACTION IN THE LOWER COURT.
The

taxpayer

has

tried

to

short-circuit

the

counterclaim of the appellant by positioning its claim for
relief in a peculiar light.
The plaintiff insists a refund is owed it because of
the claimed discrimination resulting from the application of

-9-

Section 59-5-4.5,

U.C.A.

as

:emerrl0d

i'l'J1,

·'•·t.··

hi.1ct·

procedure used in valuing locally assess0d

pt•'·rwrt '/

dt«I

59-5-57, U.C.A. as amended 1953, whjrh deals with assessn" "'
mines.

This claimed over assessment

locally assessed property

is due to the>

is being given

factor in finding full cash value.

a

fact

equalization

The plaintiff asserts this

same factor should be applied to mining valuation.

At the same

time, in order to dispense with the appellants counterclaim, the
plaintiff asserts its case is not based on wrongful valuation.
Plaintiff, by its action, has placed its valuation for thr vear
1981 into issue.
The

appellant

sees

no

merit

to

the

plaintiff's

contention outside of attempting to give a forum in which it has
everything to gain and nothing to lose.

By asking for a refund,

the plaintiff must logically show it has been overassessed.
plaintiff is not asserting the
property was wrongful.
valuations,

The

tax assessment of its valued

It is claiming that compared to local

its valuation was excessive.

By making this claim

it inherently puts its actual valuation into dispute.
The appellant respectfully submits that the plaintit:
cannot be allowed to position its claim for relief through the
bent lense which it seeks.

Before the court can conclude that c

refund is owed, the plaintiff must show that its valuation is
excessive.
issue.

Plaintiff's valuation for the year in question is

And defendants,

having been sued by plaintiff on

-10-

t

1nr1

·•

of

thP valuf' of plaintiff's property, are entitled to
thdt plaintiff's property has been undervalued

anJ

assessment.

;iT,d

POINT I I
THE UTAH TAX COURT ACT ALLOWS THE TRIAL COURT TO
DETERMINE THE TPUE CASH VALUE OF PLAINTIFF'S
PROPERTIES ONCE SUCH ISSUE IS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.
Plaintiff

initiated

the

jurisdiction

of

the

Tax

Division of the District Court by petitioning that tribunal to
determine the proper valuation of plaintiff's properties.

Upon

the filing of such petition, the Court was obliged to decide the
actual assessment value of such property, whether such valuation
resulted in a greater or lesser amount than plaintiff's original
assessment.
In Consumer's Power Companv v Big Prairie Township,
County

265

NW2d

182,

(Michigan 1978),

the

utility

petitioned the Michigan tax Court after the Township assessed
the subject's Dam at a higher value than earlier valuations
based on a new assessment technique.

Once before the Court the

County received permission to intervene and requested even a
greater value be placed on the property for all the tax years in
question.

When

the

lower Court

held with

assessment, an appeal was taken.

the

intervening

Early in the Court's

it found the tax Court had a duty, as the Legislature's
designoted agent for that purpose, to determine the true cash

-11-

value of the appellant's property. At pl88.

As in th0 pr,,sen:

case, the taxpayer charged that the Court could not
assessment beyond the initial level in a proceedinq brnuqh1
the taxpayer to have the valuation reduced.

As in this

1

Cctsro

the County raised the issue of under-assessment by and throuab
its

responsive

pleadings.

In

deciding

this

question,

Michigan Court summarizes the state's history
assessment appeals.

the

pertaining to

It found the prior review process gave the

taxpayer the option of appealing to an equalization board before
tendering payment or filing
taxes under protest.

a Court action after paying the

Only the equalization board had power to

increase the

initial tax.

That system was

because

routes

be

both

taxpayer resulting
jurisdictional

could

found unworkable

simultaneously

taken

in contradicting decisions.

language of

the Michigan

tax

by

the

Al though the

Court

did

not

expressly specify whether the Court could increase the initial
assessment,

the appellate Court construed the

law to include

such power because the tax Court had assumed the functions of
both the earlier review devices.
The powers vested in the

tax division of the Utah

District Courts under the Utah Tax Act,

Section 59-24-1,

et

seq., U.C.A. as amended 1953, also provide the lower Court with
plenary power to increase an initial assessment made by the
State Tax Commission.

-12-

Section 59-7-12,

U.C.A.

as amended 1953, gives the

,,!J State Tax Commission the power to,
1 nwer

any

assessment

made

by

it .. "

" .. correct and increase
In

reviewing the

decisions of the State Tax Commission, the tax Court may,
" ... affirm, reverse, modify or remand any order
of the State Tax Commission, and shall grant
other relief, invoke such other remedies, and
issue such orders, in accordance with its
decisions as shall be appropriate.
Section
59-24-4 U.C.A. as amended 1953."
As the reviewing Court for the State Tax Commission,
the Court has de novo review of Commission decisions.

Section

59-24-3, U.C.A. as amended 1953.

The Court then, inherently hes

those powers given the State Tax

In addition to the

powers of the Commission,

the Court has those discretionary

powers cited above.
As stated in the Consumers Power Case,
" ... from a statutory and strictly legal point of
view,
the potential for a finding of
under-assessment came into being, the instant
consumers took its §152 appeal to the Tax
Tribunal. From that moment on, the Tax Tribunal
had the jurisdiction and power to increase the
contested assessments even if no one had
appeared in opposition."
The extensive powers given the Utah Tax Court clearly
include at least those powers invested in the Michigan Tribunal.

POINT III
ONCE APPELLANT PROVES THAT CERTAIN METHODS AND
APPLICATIONS USED BY THE UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION TO VALUE PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTIES FALL
SHORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES,
SAID
PROPERTIES MUST BE ORDERED BY THE COURT TO BE
REASSESSED
USING
CONSTITUTIONALLY
VALID
METHODOLOGIES.
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The ability to challenge tax valuation methods " ,,.
the Utah State Tax Commission in collecting taxes in beh" 11'

r.

the County has been shown above to be vested in the counties
Utah.

Yet before this standing has any relevance it must be

found that a remedy exists which the Court may invoke once the
County proves the unconstitutionality of the methods used by
Utah State Tax Commission.
relief

are

inseparable.

The power to sue and the right to
This

is

especiallv

true

in

the

constitutional context.
In Jensen v Byran 40 Cal Rptr 540,

541

(California

Court of Appeals 1964) Los Angeles County, by oversight, failed
to assess the improvements of plaintiff's real property apart
from said property.
deferred

When found,

assessments.

the County made the necessary

Plaintiff

challenged this deferral.

taxpayer

The Court

unsuccessfully

found that California's

Constitution requires all property within that state to be
unless an exemption is granted by State Constitution or by
federal law.

Additionally,

it found the County had statutory

authority to make such deferred assessments.
Utah has similar Constitutional language to that of
California requiring assessment of all property not exempt by
said Constitution or by federal law.
The appellant County has

Article XIII, Section Twr

shown much of plaintiff's mineral
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1

1 1 't

,,iJJcct

inns

h,1'/f-2

escaped assessment entirely.

Such prcperty is

the deferred assessments required in Jensen.

to

In Bauer-Schweitzer Malting Company v City and County
of San Francisco 506 P2d 1019, 1020-1021

(California 1973), a

Grand Jury investigation found the County Assessor had committed
several improprieties in office.

A later civil action resulted

in new valid assessments being ordered on several properties.
The

plaintiff was

substantial
assessment.

taxes

one

of

many who

for

propert"'

was

which

required

had

to

earlier

pay

escaped

The higher Court affirmed this action even though

no fraud or collusion involving the plaintiff was shown to have
occurred.

The Court quoting the lower appellate Court found
"uniform assessments are required and that where
the applicable assessment ratio has not been
uniformally applied, escaped assessments must be
made for all years for which recovery is
permitted by law, ..

***

.. the Constitution requires that all properties
subject to taxation shall be assessed at its
full cash value."
The public policy behind the Bauer-Schweitzer case is
clear.

In

uniformity,

order

to

achieve

constitutionally

mandated

all assessable property must be appraised at its

full cash value.
Under the present facts,

the appellB_nt County has

shown that much of plaintiff's mineral extraction has escaped
Assessment entireJy.

This fact is unrebutted.

lhe contrarv was presented.

No evidence to

The defendant County has also shown
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through affidavit that much of plaintiff's
grossly undervalued.

Although it is tru1•

real

the

Tax Commission has discretion in how it valur•"

pr"pe•rt•·

dcfend.1rt
tl10

10.
i

11

µ 1 ()P"'

tax payer, that valuation must reflect actual cash vcJlu,,,
Constitution Article XIII, Section three.
Once the appellant has shown that past valuations of
plaintiff's

property

have

constitutional criteria,
Commission

must

then

it

make

failed

to

is apparent
valid

meet
that

the

above

the State Tax

assessments

for

those

properties, at least as far back as Utah law allows, which is a
maximum of 5 years.
In Hewlett-Packard Company v County of Santa Clara 123
Cal Rptr

195,

199

(California Court of l\.ppeals

1975),

the

taxpayer had provided all information required by law to the
assessor.

For five years the assessor mistakenly valued much o[

the property on a manufacturer cost basis not realizing the
property was made by the taxpayer and therefor subject to a
higher

assessment

under

the

trade

level

method.

When

mistake was found addi tiona 1 assessments were made
years.

The Court action followed.

the

for those

The taxpayer asserted such

escaped assessments may be had only if caused by the wronadoing
of the assessor.

The Court held otherwise quoting Excell-0

Corporation v County of Alameda 107 Cal Rptr. 839

(1973),

Bauer-Schweitzer establishes that propert'.' must
be assessed uniformally, that uniformity must he
accomplished even though there has heen cin
earlier assessment, where the assessment was too
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low, and that an underassessment cannot be
susti:iined althouoh all parties acted in good
faith. (emphasis added by Court)
The application of this Court's holding to the present
'acts is direct.

Even though both the assessor and taxpayer

believed each was acting in conformance with law, once it is
shown constitutional requirements of uniformity and valuation at
full cash value have not been attained such property must be
re-assessed.
The
portions

of

appellant
plaintiff's

seriously undervalued.

has

already

property

shown

escaped

that

significant

assessmFnt

or

is

All such properties must be re-assessed

so as to achieve the required uniformity.

POINT IV
UTAH COUNTIES HAVE CONSISTENTLY ENJOYED JUDICIAL
STANDING TO MAINTAIN ACTIONS AGAINST THE UTAH STATE
TAX COMMISSION WHEN THE PROPRIETARY INTERESTS OF THE
COUNTY ARE AT STAKE.
The Utah State Tax Commission is given a peculiar mix
of responsibilities.
tax assessment,

Looking at those duties involving property

the Commission has essentially two functions.

The first involves hearing local taxpayer appeals taken from the
individual County Equalization decisions.
U.C.A. as amended 1953.

See Section 59-7-10,

This function also includes equalizing

the value of properties between counties, aiding and supervising
the county assessors

in executing their local taxing duties,

''r0anizing conventions of county assessors for the discussion of
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tax problems in the State,

and to requirP Cntlnt-:,· i\tt-nrnc"

institute needed leaal artions to enforce
areas.

t"':

tn1'

l""r

:r·

Se<" Section 59-5-4fl(8)toll7).
The Utah State Tax Commission's other funct: ion

of valuing,

assessing and apportioning

to

1

the counties,

s th

thar

property which by law the Commission is charged with assessing,
Se<"

Section

function,
the

59-5-3

U.C.A.

as

amended

1953.

Within

this

the taxes generated by the Commission's work belong ,,

counties.

determines

the

It

is

a

value.

county
This

tax.

duty of

The
the

Commission merely
Tax

Commission

is

different from its management function in that it is working
the counties sole benefit.

:o,

The Tax Commission is the fiduciary

agent of the counties in executing this task.
The counties perform a
taxing districts.

similar role for their local

This fiduciary obligation was recognized b\'

this Court in the recent case of The Board of Education of the
Granite School District v.
February 8, 1983.

Salt Lake County No.

taxing districts

challenge the counties actions in executing
This Court

filed

As in the present case, no specific statuton·

language exists which gives the

duty.

17175,

found

between the units due

that a

fiduciary

standing to

their collection

obligation existed

to the nature of the

relationship.

A

result contrary to the public interest would occur here if the
County

was

without

power

to

question

the

Commission's actions when operating in its
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Utah

State

Tax

fiduciary mode ;r:

and in behcilc of the county ..

",f,, I ness

r•f

The ability to challenge the

the Tax Commission's valuation methods becomes

,., i1tial when nc,ting thi'lt the property which the Commission
1 dXPS

is

one

1pp,dlant

of

has.

the

largest,

single

An

underassessment

revenue

sources

of

plaintiff

the

substantially damages many essential County programs.

the

The tax

revenues collected from the plaintiff are for the sole use and
benefit of the appellant and its various taxing entities.

The

appellant could not meet its public responsibility without these
funds.

Appellant must therefore have the power to question the

results of the Tax Commission's fiduciary actions in behalf of
the County.
The County appellant is not attempting by this action
to obtain a vnluation technique
revenue.

The County wants equity.

Nothing more--nothing less.

that

simply produces more

The County wants equality.

Case law is rampant with authority

that holds the Utah State Tax Commission to have discretion in
which of many

lawful valuation techniques

it chooses.

The

County is asserting that defendant Tax Commission is not fully
performing its function in that plaintiff's properties are not
being valued at

their

full

cash value.

If the County is

prevented from questioning these valuations,

it will be left

without a remedy and only the discretion of the Utah State Tax
Commission will determine what revenue the County will receive.
Thf"

unr!ervalued

taxpayer

certainly will
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not

challenge

the

undervaluation and if the County is precluded
the Commission,

the

public would

likewisP

ttTn-

1,, ,.

b,,

Who then will be the

using the courts as a remedy.

.-!1;1]

lva+,·h

Not the Tax Commission, nor the underassessed property ovmer
Without

the

statutory

tools

standards

of
of

enforcement,
equity

and

the
of

property at cash value is meaningless.

Cons ti tutione.l
valuing

and

plaintiff's

Such a result would bP

inconsistent with the very purpose of setting such boundaries.
The lower Court refused the appellant standing
basis of cases handed down

in Washington and Colorado.

tho

The

Trial Court stated the Utah authority cited and discussed by
appellant dealt with procedural matters over which the County
and State held concurrent jurisdiction.
A review of the cases relied on by the Trial Court in
declining to judicially recognize the County right to question
the

assessment

and

the Tax Commission

assessment

practic<"s

illuminated the difference of functions given to the State Tax
Commission and the resultant mistake made by the lower Court in
not recognizing

this difference.

In Board of County Commissioners of the County of
Dolores v. Love 470 P2d 861, 862

(Colorado 1970), the plaintiff

therein was attemptinq to challenge the State Tax Commission's
review and reappraisal of properties earlier valued by the
County Assessor.

The County initially assessed the propertv

was represented in the administrative review. Pelying
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Dillon doctrine, the Court found the County was without the

thn

,i, ii st 1nclcn0 to judicicilly challenge the Board's supervisory

l"<"1sion.

ThPse facts fnll squarPly within the above mentioned

i:cview function of the Utah State Tax Commission versus its
fiduciary

function.

The

present

facts

involve

the

tax

nssessment functions of the Tax Commission, not its supervisory
role.

Further,

as discussed below,

expelled the Dillon Rule

as

this Court has previously

a delegating

source of County

pnwers.

For the same reasons, the case of Adams County Board
of Commissioners v. Union Pacific Railroad Companv 525 P2d 1201,
1204

(Colorado 1974), cannot be used to prevent the appellant

from challenging the actions of the State Tax Commission.

The

Adams County Court adopted the Love decision in toto as its
basis tor the affirmance.
In Pettit v.

Board of Tax Appeals 538 P2d 501,

502

(Washington 1975), the facts again involved the local assessor's
valuation being contested by the taxpayer.

Again the County's

interests were represented at the appeal before the State Board
of Equalization.

Only after a decision in favor of the taxpayer

did the assessor attempt review in the Courts.

Here, the County has had no voice in the process which
determined the amounts of revenue it alone is entitled to.
If standing is denied the County defendant here, its
,charges concerning the Tax Commission's valuations will never be
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heard.

The County will be relegated to a position in which it

takes whatever revenue the Tax Commission dPciclPs
notwithstanding

the

fact

that

there

exists a

tc,

Const

'Jl ,,,

1 tl!t:, ""

mandate of a 20% assessment of the plaintiff's full cash valu.
of its property.
The Court in King County v Washington State Board of
Tax Appeals 622 P2d 898
facts

as

those

found

in

(Washington 1981) ,was presented similar
Pettit.

Again

appraised the property of taxpayer.
appealed

to

assessment.

the

Board

of

Tax

The local assessment was

Appeals

The County then filed

the County Assessor

which

lowered

the

the action in the Superior

Court for review.
Not one of the cases relied on by the lower Court in
dismissing

defendant

involved herein.

County's

claims

dealt

with

the

issue

The defendant County at no time valued the

plaintiff's property and it has never had an opportunity to
its voice heard by any forum.
of plaintiff's property
County's budget.

is

a

At the same time,
most

The County is

the

important

the valuation

factor

to

the

interested party to the

plaintiff's valuation in that the valuation is for the County's
benefit.
The lower Court disregarded several Utah cases brought
forth by the appellant to show that Utah counties continually
have had standing to challenge the methods of the Utah State To•
Commission while operating as the County's tax collector.
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The early case of Salt Lake County v State Board of
1

55 P 378,

378 (Utah 1898)

, ' 111 1' i plP to the present case.
its

former

name

of

the

holds facts similar in

There the Tax Conunission under

State

Board

of

Equalization

was

challenged by the County concerning its methods of apportioning
the earlier made assessment of railroad stock to the various
counties.

There the State Tax Conunission was acting in its

fiduciary capacity.
1V2s

Similar to the present facts,

challF?nging the method of apportionment.

examining

the

existing

apportionment

The Court, after

method

defendant to re-apportion the assessments.

the County

ordered

the

It said

In any event, we have no doubt the Board can
make a more correct assessment from information
obtained from the officers of the respective
roads. (emphasis added)
The Court focused on what method was fairer to the
County.

The present appellant has previously shown that present

valuation techniques used by the defendant Tax Conunission do not
adequately measure
case,

full

cash value.

As done in the earlier

this Court should require a more correct valuation of

claimants properties.
The State Tax Conunission's method of apportionment was
again challenged in Juab County v Bailey et al., 140 P.764, 765
(Utah 1914).
situated

in

apportioned.

This time it dealt with how the proceeds of a mine
both

Juab

The Court

and

Utah

counties were

respectively

focused mostly on the timing of the

County's complaint, not raising the standing issue sua sponte as
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it did the timeliness one.
issue of

tardiness,

it

Noting the attent inn

seems

like 1 y

the

Court

it

a2v0

W()u l d

the-

!in'

r

disposed of the case on standing if it had felt such a holdi·
would be accurate.
773

See also Rich County v Bailey et al 154 2.

(Utah 1916); and Mammouth City v Snow et al 253 P. 680 (Utar,

1926) .
A similar fiduciary assessment process by the State
Tax Commission to the present case was challenged in the more
contemporary case

of Washington County

Commission, et al 133 P 2d 564, 567-568

et

al

v

State 'J'ax

(Utah 1943).

There the

constitutionality and application of a statute exempting those
portions of electrical utility companies used to pump irrigation
water was disputed by the plaintiff County.

Although the Court

does not discuss the standing issue directly, it does allow the
County to challenge the constitutionality of a State Statute, a
legislative

act

having

more

credence

than

the

presently

challenged administrative acts which execute such authority.
The County in the present case is asking the Court to
give it a

forum in which it may attempt to

show that the

defendant Utah State Tax Commission is not living up to its
duties.

The only entity having a

standing

is

the

plaintiff

higher qualification

taxpayer.

How

often

will

for
an

advantaged taxpayer challenge the escape or underassessment of
its own property?

Realistically

then,

no

exists if the County is denied standing.
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enforcement

tool

If no enforcement

exists, no boundaries exist to the discretion of the Utah State
1·.-i'

f_'omrni ss ion.

Is it an entity unto itself or must it serve

tile

nc'eds of

citizens of the State of Utah?

The lower Court's dismissal of the defendant's claims
was based on cases dealing with Court Appeals by the County from
the

review decisions of the various

State Tax Commissions.

Those courts subsequently held that the counties had no standing
to appeal

those

review decisions.

However,

this Court has

previously held that in this state, the counties have the right
to even challenge these supervisory decisions.

See Countv Board

of Equalization of Kane County v State Tax Commission 50 P2d 418
(1935); Baker v Tax Commission 520 P2d 203
County v Tax Commission 532 P2d 680
Indicative

of

the

(1974); and Salt Lake

(1975).

legislative

intent

that

Utah

counties have the needed standing to challenge the methods of
the State Tax Commission is S.B.

208 which was passed by both

houses of the 1983 Utah Legislature and signed into law by the
governor.

During the review and debate involved in the creation

of this law, an amendment was added which specifically exempted
the bill's effect upon the present action.
of the

historic

As a strong signal

intent of the Utah State Legislature,

this

amendment was explicitly removed from the bill before the bill
was

successfully

passed

by

both

specifically applies to this case.

houses.

It

therefore

At the time of passage, the

Legislature was much aware of the erroneous interpretation of
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the

Trial

Court

in

Appellant believes
County's

this
the

case.

intcerpretation

standing powers

is

still

this

needed

in

c', u1t

orrlPr

fnr

i

appellant to challenge the methodology of thP Utah

1·,,
Tcix

Commission.

POINT V
THE APPELLANT MAY RAISE THE ISSUE OF PLAINTIFF'S
UNDERVALUATION THROUGH THF. COUNTERCLAIM DEVICE.
In dismissing the appellant's claim against thP
parties, the lower Court seems to have confused the issue of the
appellant's standing, with the Court's statutory authority to
increase

the

Contrary

to

plaintiff's
the

lower

initially

Court's

assigned

memorandum

Consumer's Power Company opinion did

assessment.

decision,

the

not decide whether the

intervening County had the ability to judicially challenge the
taxpayers assessment.

The Michigan opinion only discussed the

valuation method which best determined the true cash value of
the utility and whether a greater assessed valuation than that
set by the assessing authority could be levied by the tax court.
supra,

pl85.

This misunderstanding of the Consumer's

Power

decision holding led the lower Court in the present action to
misconstrue the statutory authority it has in reviewing orders
of the State Tax Commission.

The importance of this issue to

the appellant and to the tax Court can f'.Ot be overst.:iter'. an•'
requires reversal of the lower Court's decision.
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Due
' r' rit

tlv•

.:>.bsence

of

language

in

l i ty

valuation,
to

the County must be

Utah

challenge

the

taxpayer's

found to have the

assessment

counterclaim once the property owner puts
issue.

current

res authorizing the County to appeal a Utah State Tax

"'n""
1

to

through

a

its valuation at

In Pima Countv v Cyprus-Pima Mining Company 579 P2d

1081, 1083

(Arizona 1978)

the Court held that the County could

not question the valuation of the taxpayer except in the manner
provided by law.

There, an open pit copper mine's assessment

was appealed by the taxpayer to the State Board of Tax Appeals.
Not satisfied with the result, the mine owner pursued its appeal
through the Courts.

In its responsive pleading,

the County

affirmatively asserted that the valuation should be increased.
The Court found since the County had not pursued its statutory
right to appeal the decision of the Administrative Board, it
could not do so though an affirmative defense.

Arizona law

specifically provides that a County may appeal a decision of the
Tax Board.

See A.R.S.

Section 42-123 (B)

Conversely,

Utah law specifically finds only the taxpayer may

(7),

and 42-151 (c).

initiate a judicial challenge to an assessment of the State Tax
Commission.

See Section 59-11-11, U.C.A. as amended 1953.

Once

the judicial determination of valuation has been triggered by
the taxpayer the County must be allowed to do more than defend a
valuation which

it had nothing to do with,

has

no

records

-ovnrinq the basis for the assessment, and often cannot support.
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The Pima County Court's explnnution

h,-,Jrli1,, 1

fo1

that the County did have the right to initiate ""

,1pp<'l

review of the taxpayer's valuation but did not do

llt"'1\1

counties do not have the statutory authority to begin a Judie'
review of the State Tax Commission's valuation.

1 •

To protect

their revenue they must at least have the ability to prove to
the Court a taxpayer's true assessment once the taxpayer has
asked the Court

to determine

the

true

cash value

of

its

property.
To find that the valuation initially assigned a StatP
assessed taxpayer is the maximum valuation amount it will be
forced to accept creates a tremendously litigious atmosphere for
this class of taxpayer.

Litigation is encouraged, even invited.

The taxpayer is given a no lose forum in which to bring its
assessment.

Coordinately, the County is held to the devastating

legal expense of defending every such action only to obtain an
assessment amount which even if successful may be well below
that which it can prove to be the actual valuation.

Such a

result could not have been the intent of the authors of Section
59-11-11,

nor can it be tolerated realizing the contemporary

financial burden of Utah's Counties.
As

a

prerequisite

to

the

plaintiff's

obtaining

jurisdiction under the Tax Court Act, it must pay the originallv
assessed tax amount under protest and then ask the lower Cnurt
to find the actual assessment of the property.
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The purpose

1'0hind

thr'

,,,, ernPd

protest
tl1cit

requirement

is

ownership of those

to

alert

funds

all

entities

is disputed and the

court might order their refund to the taxpayer.
Here, the plaintiff taxpayer complied with the protest
requirement.
thosA

funds.

All entities were alerted to the contingency of
The

appellant

County

can

now

challenge

the

valuation by counterclaim using the taxpayer s earlier protest.
1

If successful, the County will be entitled to a
revenue than it originally was apportioned.

amount of

If unsuccessful the

taxpayer's protest has prevented all concerned entities

from

unduly relying on these funds.
No
prevents

the

procedural
County

or

from

subs tan ti ve

enjoying the

reason
right

exists

which

to prove

the

taxpayer's actual valuation once the taxpayer has asked the Tax
Court to decide this question.

Equity and the Utah Constitution

requires that this be allowed.
The taxpayer in the lower action named the appellant
County as a defendant.

The mining company must have believed

the appellant to be an indispensable party to this action.

Once

the appellant was named a defendant, it had the duty, right and
opportunity to act
welfare.

in a manner consistent with its general

Both the taxpayer and the State Tax Commission alleged

that the County is barred from raising a valuation counterclaim
because no specific statutory authority exists which bestows
this riqht upon it.

In State v Hutchinson 624 P2d 1116, 1118

-29-

(Utah 1980), this Court rli scussed the alJclitv rd
establish an ordinance in furtherance of tlw

n

11nt

cc•mmun i "" ,,

safety, and welfare even though the State had nut qrant ... i
locality the specific statutory authority to create
The well-known Dillon

ordinance.

Rule

is

the

LI,

such an

invalidatil'c;

source which had traditionally required specific delegation of
rule making authority.

This Court said,

"The rule requiring strict construction of the
powers delegated by the Legislature to counties
and municipalities is a rule which is archaic,
unrealistic and unresponsive to the current
needs of both State and Local governments and
effectively nullifies the legislative orant of
general police powers to the counties."
Later, this Court cited with approval from the earliec
case of State v. Stanford 66 P.1061

(1901),

[T] he Constitution implies a right of local
self-government to each county, and a right to
establish a system of county government is
expressly recognized and enjoined. The power is
given to create the county government, not to
administer to such a system when created.
The
right of the Legislature was to provide for and
put in action, not to run and operate, the
machinery of the local government to the
disenfranchisement of the people.
People v
Hurlbut, 24 Michigan 44, 9 am. Rep. 103.
Granted the Hutchinson case dealt not with the power
of a county to seek its legal level of tax revenue, but with the
power to legislate a campaign funding ordinance.

However, the

principles set forth in that case are at least as applicable to
a

county

securing

its

just

revenue

legislation.
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as

they

are

to

local

The Statc
1 ix

rc-"Jc

·nurity.

ln

ntcP

0

Tax Commission has absolutely no intP.rest in

clc'ri VPcl Erom the properties it assesses for the

this

function,

it does not

supP. rv is ion to the County.
works

in

behalf of

serve as a board of

While serving in this manner,

the County as

a

fiduciary.

It

it

is the

County's trustee ..
To find that the County appellant does not have the
minimal power to raise by counterclaim alone the true valuation
of a taxpayer assessed by the State Tax Commission is to hold
that

the Co1mnission is utterly above

CPrtainly
Relying

will

on

not

the

bring

the

reputations

of

the

law.

under-assessments
the

individual

The taxpayer
to

light.

State

Tax

Commissioners to guide their assessment decisions has never been
a resource which can replace the judicial forum.

In sum,

the

County must have the ability to prove a larger assessment exists
if the system is to function in balance.
Consideration should also be given to the absence of
harm crP.ated by holding with the appellant's position.

Since

counties could only dispute the valuation after a taxpayer has
brought its valuation into 'question', no inordinate amount of
litigation would result.

Since the taxpayer will not have a no

loose situation by bringing its assessment to the Courts,

the

frivolous cases will be reduced.
The

Utah Tax Court Act

gives

the

lower Court

the

necessary authority to increase a taxpayer's assessment once the
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initial assessment is proven legally inadequAtP.

Althouqh nr,

statutory language exists providing thP appPllant with
to bring an assessment challenge to the Court,
in

logic

or

law which

would

disallow

the

no re>AS•·t• .

appellant

tinrn

attempting to prove a higher assessment value once the taxpayet
asks the Court to determine its valuation.

The lower court's

decision must therefore be reversed.

POINT VI

THE APPELLANT MUST BE ALLOWED ACCESS TO THE
MINING ASSESSMENT BOOKS REQUIRED BY LAW TO BE
MAINTAINED BY THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.
The lower Court held against the appellant upon their
cross-claim which sought to compel the Tax Commission to produce
the mining assessment books required to be maintained by the
State Tax Commission under Section 59-5-56, U.C.A.

as amended

1953 and deliver the data upon which plaintiff's assessments
were based.
Through

the

contrary to sta.tute,

discovery

process

it

was

found

that

the Utah State Tax Commission has not

maintained the assessment book of mines.

However,

pertinent

information which would be entered in the mandated record book
is available to the State Tax Commission.

This information has

been withheld by the Commission from the appellant except for an
insufficient summary earlier provided through discovery.
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The 1983 Legislative General Session held in March of
generated S.B.

by the Governor soon thereafter.

,r,d
l

he

This bill was passed by both houses

184.

State

Tax

intormation

Commission

which

to

normally

allow

would

County

be

found

This law requires
review of
in

the

the

mining

assessment book.
This newly enacted legislation obviously nullifies the
need for this Court tn interpret the appellant's rights in this
regard.

More

interpreted

to

importantly,

this

back

Court's

up

this

legislation
recent

should

be

holdings which

provides Utah counties with more autonomy in handling their
ever-increasing complex problems.

The counties must have, and

are receiving more of the management powers needed to deal with
these responsibilities and any decision of this Court should be
consistent with that philosophy.

POINT VII

THE TAX COURT IS EMPOWERED TO ORDER A VALID
ASSESSMENT OF ALL PROPERTIES OF TAXPAYERS WHICH
HAVE ESCAPED LAWFUL ASSESSMENT WITHIN THE PAST
FIVE TAXING YEARS.
The appellant has asked the lower Court to order the
valid assessments of those properties of plaintiff which have
escaped valid assessment within the past five tax years.
power to order such assessment is
11.C.A. as amended 1953.

It states
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The

found at Section 59-5-17,

"Any property discoverPd by th•" i\s:-cPssor

have

escaped

asspssment

may

be

time as far back as five yeors

of discovery, .. .

11

z1::_;:=-,, ,;s1'<l ,1t
prinr tc• tlH>

This authority is specifically not

limited

tr,
t1n1•

tc

l•

l-<

assessors and this Court has previously ruled that this law is
available to assessments made by the Utah State Tax Commissirin.
In Union Portland Cement Company v Morgan County 23C
P.1020,

(Utah 1924),

the taxpayer's property was 0f the type

assessed by the State Board of Equalization
the State Tax Commission).

(The forerunner or

The plaintiff thPre had filPd its

affidavit of property ownership and duly paid the assessed tax.
Later in the year the Board discovered the property affidavit to
be insufficient in that additional property existed which had
not been included in the taxpayer's statement.
and

assessed

the

property and

the

taxpayer

The Board valued
later paid

additional tax under protest and filed the Court action.
complaint,

the

plaintiff

asserted

that

once

the

the
In its

Board had

performed its duty, the Board could not raise the assessments on
the basis of error.

the Court found,

" ... it is quite immaterial for what reason
property was omitted from the assessment roll.
The only question is:
was it omitted? and, if
it was, it is the duty of the assessor (in this
case, the Board of Equalization) to assess it."
Clearly then, the State Tax Commission may assess all
property of the taxpayer which has escaped assessment within the
past five years.

The Tax Court, with its reviewina pnwers ovP1

the State Tax Commission may require that i'1dministrative body
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L'

perform :ts legally mirndated job, including the assessment of

The

property

of

a

taxpayer

which

has

been

underassessed in the same five year period may also be required
to

undergo

a

valid

re-assessment

by

property

also

may

assessment.

valid
fall

means

The

of

within

question

previously

the

five

of whether

under-assessed

year

statute

of

limitations was discussed in Mammoth City v Snow, et al.,
P.680,

684

(Utah 1926).

253

This case principally dealt with the

proper assessment and apportionment of the mining properties of
defendant.

The owner of several mines had reported its net

proceeds without designating from which mining property they
came.

This resulted in the plaintiff municipality believing

that it had not been apportioned its fair share of the tax
revenue.

This Court found the defect not significant enough to

call for a re-assessment.

It said

" .. [this defect] does not justify us in
regarding such assessments as a nullity and
directing the Board to now make an assessment as
though none had been made.
We have no
allegations er proof that the assessment which
was made was fraudulently, or based on a gross
or any undervaluation, and no proof that such or
any net proceeds of such mines or mining claims
were omitted from assessment, or that they
escaped assessment or taxation. (emphasis added)
This Court rightfully found that an undervaluation is
as legally inadequate as no valuation at all.

Therefore, those

properties of the plaintiff which were undervalued are just as
invalid as those properties escaping assessment altogether.
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The facts of BauPr-Sch\vPitzer Maltina
City and County of San Fcancisco 506 P2d 1019,
1973),

as set forth

charged with

a

fully above,

variety

of

11,
111n

(C,4J ·

include the ass0ss0r lic'11 ,1

improprieties

cind

much

of

the

previously assessed land being re-assessed in a valid manner and
at its correct value.
did

not

fit

within

The plaintiff alleged such re-assessments
the

statutory

language

of

"escaping

assessment," and therefore past tax years could not be examined.
The Court overturned earlier case law by holding
"To the extent that property has been assessed
at an assessment ratio lower than the ratio
properly established by the assessor for a
particular year, such property has escaped
assessment."
By overturning earlier case law which prevented valid
re-assessments of land if the same had been earlier assessed in
any manner,

the Court recognized that no difference existed

between property invalidly assessed and property not assessed at
all.

Constitutionally mandated uniformity of assessment must be

achieved.

Even where the taxpayer was not to blame for the

underassessment, collecting that revenue actually owed requires
the taxpayer to do no more than it is socially required to do,

contributing its fair share to the tax burden.
Here, much of plaintiff's properties have been shown
to be severely underassessed or to
entirely.

have escaped assessment

The taxes for 1981, are clearly open to re-valuaticr.

That property which has escaped assessment for the five years
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, 1nr

'-,<'n

to thE' 1981 tax year must also now be properly taxed.
exists

,

No

for differef'tiating underassessed property from
property.

Therefore, all plaintiff's property not

previously having been fully valued must now be assessed as far
back as Utah law allows.

CONCLUSION

The appellant has always had by law and necessity, the
judicial

standing

to

challenge

actions as tax collector.

the

State

Tax

Commission's

The lower Court under the powers

given it by the Utah Tax Court Act has the capacity to hear
issues dealing with the propriety of a taxpayer's valuation,
determine the correct method of valuation, and require that such
valuation methodology be applied to the property of taxpayer.
In the case of property assessed by the State Tax
Commission, the appellant must have the ability to affirmatively
prove the valuation of property once the taxpayer has brought
the issue before the court.

To find otherwise is to commit the

County to an on-going no-win battle and would further bind the
County to valuations which it had no part of making and often
cannot support.
Once improper valuations are found by the Court the
assessments for the five years preceding such finding may then
be

examined

for

impropriety.

The
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appellant

respectfully

requests this Court to reverse the cl0c1sion r,f the
and

to

remand

this

case

for

a

trial

on

tlw

J.,vc<>r

mei i t ,

,

,, 1 , 1

instructions consistent with the points raised hen::111.
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